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Abstract
Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) are deployed on most present server, desktop, and even mobile platforms.
Nowadays, a growing number of applications leverage the high parallelism offered by this architecture to speed-up
general purpose computation. This phenomenon is called GPGPU computing (General Purpose GPU computing).
The aim of this work is to discover and highlight security issues related to CUDA, the most widespread platform for
GPGPU computing. In particular, we provide details and proofs-of-concept about a novel set of vulnerabilities CUDA
architectures are subject to, that could be exploited to cause severe information leak. Following (detailed) intuitions
rooted on sound engineering security, we performed several experiments targeting the last two generations of CUDA
devices: Fermi and Kepler. We discovered that these two families do suffer from information leakage vulnerabilities.
In particular, some vulnerabilities are shared between the two architectures, while others are idiosyncratic of the
Kepler architecture. As a case study, we report the impact of one of these vulnerabilities on a GPU implementation of
the AES encryption algorithm. We also suggest software patches and alternative approaches to tackle the presented
vulnerabilities. To the best of our knowledge this is the first work showing that information leakage in CUDA is
possible using just standard CUDA instructions. We expect our work to pave the way for further research in the
field.1
Index Terms
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I. INTRODUCTION
Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) are a widespread and still underutilized resource. They are available on most
present Desktop PCs, laptops, servers and even mobile phones and tablets. They are often used as cost-effective
High Performance Computing (HPC) resources, as in computing clusters [1].
CUDA (Compute Unified Device Architecture - NVIDIATM) is by far the most widespread GPU platform,
OpenCL (by AMDTM) being its only competitor. Most present applications leverage CUDA for speeding-up scientific
computing-intensive tasks or for computational finance operations [2]. GPU computational power is also employed
to offload the CPU from security sensitive computations. As an example, various cryptographic algorithms have
been ported to GPUs [3]–[9]. Such applications require the encryption key or other sensitive data to be present on
the GPU device where they are potentially exposed to unauthorized access. Any kind of information leakage from
such applications would seriously hurt the success of the shared-GPU computing model, where the term shared-
GPU indicates all those scenarios where the GPU resource is actually shared among different users, whether it is on
a local server, on a cluster machine or on a GPU cloud [10] (originating the GPU-as-a-Service —a specialization
of the more general class Computing-as-a-Service).
GPUs are increasingly deployed as Computing-as-a-Service on the Cloud [11], [12]. In fact, sharing GPU
resources brings several benefits such as sparing the cost involved in building and maintaining a HW/SW GPU
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2infrastructure. However, the security implications on both GPU computing clusters and on remote GPU-as-a-Service
offerings, such as those by companies like Softlayers and Amazon, can be dramatic. Furthermore, in view of the
GPU virtualization approach offered by the upcoming NVIDIA VGX Hypervisor [13], information leakage risks
would dramatically increase. In addition, performance-oriented approaches such as CUDADMA [14] cannot but
worsen the information leakage problem. Unfortunately, there is no effective control on how parallel code (a.k.a.
kernels) is actually executed on a GPU, given that CUDA drivers are based on proprietary code. GPU architecture
and hardware/software implementations are not mature enough when it comes to security considerations [15], [16].
Indeed, current GPU device drivers are aimed at performance rather than security and isolation, even if open source
software stacks are beginning to appear from reverse-engineered CUDA device drivers [17]; however, functionality,
compatibility, and performance are still very unsatisfactory. As such, it is not possible to verify the internals of
GPU middleware and driver executed code. In addition, OS-level support for GPU computing is in its infancy [18].
The vulnerabilities and deficiencies of such closed-source systems can only be discovered by leveraging both the
disclosed details and the black-box runtime analysis of GPUs.
Further, confidentiality over GPU data and computation has to be guaranteed in order for the shared-GPU approach
to achieve widespread acceptance. The aim of this work is to investigate the security of the CUDA platform, with
a special focus on information leakage. This work focused on Linux, as it is the most widely deployed architecture
in GPU clusters and clouds [19].
A. Contribution
This paper provides a number of contributions to the problem of secure computing on Graphics Processing
Units, with a focus on the CUDA GPGPU computing context [20]. In particular, following a detailed analysis of
the CUDA architecture, source code was designed, built, and instrumented in order to assess the security of the
CUDA architecture. It is worth noting that we leveraged perfectly standard GPU code to show the information
leakage flaws. As for the first vulnerability described in this work, we were able to induce information leakage
on GPU shared memory. Further, an information leakage vulnerability based on GPU global memory, and another
one based on GPU register spilling over global memory were discovered. As a case study we evaluated the impact
of one of these leakages on a publicly available GPU implementation of cryptographic algorithms. In particular,
we demonstrated that through the global memory vulnerability it is possible to access both the plaintext and the
encryption key. The interesting results we obtained and described in this paper open a broad new area. The
discovered vulnerabilities could be used to successfully attack commercial security-sensitive algorithms such as the
encryption algorithms running on GPUs.
Finally, this paper proposes and discusses countermeasures and alternative approaches to fix the presented infor-
mation leakage flaws.
B. Roadmap
This work is organized as follows: Section II discusses publicly available details of the CUDA architecture.
Section III describes the rationales behind the discovered vulnerabilities and provides attack details. Section IV
introduces the experimental setup and attacks implementation and shows experimental results. Section V describes
in detail a case study based on AES CUDA implementation and analyzes the results. Section VI discusses possible
remedies. Section VII introduces related work on CUDA and state-of-the-art results on information leakage. Finally,
Section VIII provides some final considerations and directions for future work.
II. CUDA ARCHITECTURE
CUDA is a parallel computing platform for NVIDIA GPUs. CUDA represents the latest result of GPU evolution:
old GPUs supported only specific fixed-function pipelines, whereas recent GPUs are increasingly flexible. In fact,
General Purpose GPU computing (GPGPU) [21] allows deploying massively parallel computing on COTS hardware
where the GPU can be used as a “streaming co-processor”. In this context, present SDKs allow to simplify access
to GPU resources to solve a broad set of problems [20].
The CUDA Software Development Kit (SDK) introduces concepts such as streams and kernels. kernels are
special functions, that, when called, are run N times in parallel by N different CUDA threads. The SDK allows
the programmer to write kernel and host code using an enhanced version of the traditional C, C++ and FORTRAN
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Fig. 1. Main steps in compiling source code for CUDA devices
programming languages (as well as Java see [22]). The number of CUDA threads that run a kernel in parallel for
a given call is specified at runtime through the execution configuration. By changing configuration parameters it is
possible to group threads in one or more blocks, depending on the parallel task that must be performed.
CUDA source code is thus split into two components, host code (run by the CPU) and device code (run by
the GPU). This latter will get compiled to an intermediate language called PTX [23]. There exist several PTX
versions: one for each compute capability (NVIDIA way of defining hardware versions, see Table I). In addition,
at kernel deployment/install time, such intermediate code is further compiled by the CUDA device driver to binary
CUBIN code, which is actually tailored to the specific target physical GPU where it will be executed. This approach
allows specific code optimization to be tied to the actual GPU architecture. The CUDA compilation and deployment
process is depicted in Figure 1.
The CUDA architecture can be synthesized as follows:
• a binary file comprising host and PTX [23] object code;
• the CUDA user-space closed source library (libcuda.so);
• the NVIDIA kernel-space closed source GPU driver (nvidia.ko);
• the hardware GPU with its interconnecting bus (PCI Express or PCIe), memory (Global, Shared, Local,
Registers) and computing cores (organized in Blocks and Threads)—(see Figure 2 [24]).
CUDA allows the developer to use two different APIs: runtime API and driver API. The former frees the
programmer from tedious low-level tasks but does not allow specifying finer interaction details with the hardware.
The latter allows accessing some inner “obscure” features of the GPU and as such it can be leveraged to obtain
better performance and/or to enable advanced features. In particular, the driver API is implemented in the nvcuda
dynamic library which is copied on the system during the installation of the device driver. It is a handle-based,
imperative API: most objects are referenced by opaque handles that may be specified to functions to manipulate
the objects. A CUDA context is analogous to a CPU process. Contexts are leveraged by CUDA to handle relevant
tasks such as virtual memory management for both host and GPU memory. All resources and actions performed
within the driver API are encapsulated inside a CUDA context, and the system should automatically clean up
these resources when the context is destroyed. However, this is just a working hypothesis (even if corroborated
by experimental results), since implementation details are not known, as already mentioned above. Applications
manage concurrency through CUDA streams. A stream is a sequence of commands (possibly issued by different
host threads) that execute in order. Different streams may execute their commands in any order with respect to one
another—this form of parallelism comes with no guarantee on streams scheduling.
A. CUDA Memory Hierarchies
To improve performance, CUDA features several memory spaces and memory types (e.g. global memory, shared
memory). Main memory hierarchy layers are depicted in Figure 2. Please note that Figure 2 shows only a logical
organization of CUDA memory hierarchy; for instance, depending on the size of the reserved memory, the compiler
may choose to map local memory on registers or global memory. All threads have access to the same global memory.
Each CUDA thread has private local memory. Each thread block has shared memory visible to all threads of the
block and with the same lifetime as the block. In fact, what happens to the shared memory when a block completes
its execution is not specified. There are also two additional read-only memory spaces accessible by all threads: the
constant and texture memory spaces. The global, constant, and texture memory spaces are persistent across kernel
launches by the same application [23].
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CUDA Compute Capability (CC) VERSION, INTRODUCED NOVELTY, AND POTENTIAL SOURCES OF SECURITY ISSUES
CC Novelty w.r.to previous version Potential Leakage due to
1.0 original architecture memory isolation
1.1 atomic op. on global mem. memory isolation
1.2 atomic op. on shared mem., 64-bit words, warp-vote functions memory isolation
1.3 double precision floating point memory isolation
2.0 64-bit addressing, Unified Virtual Addressing, GPUDirect memory isolation, GPUDirect issues
2.1 performance improvements memory isolation, GPUDirect issues
3.0 enhanced stream parallelism and resource sharing memory isolation, GPUDirect issues
3.5 Dynamic Parallelism, Hyper-Q memory isolation, GPUDirect issues,
Hyper-Q isolation issues
✁ ✂✄
Fig. 2. CUDA memory hierarchy and threads
1) Global Memory: Global memory is accessed via
32-, 64-, or 128-byte memory transactions. This is
by far the largest type of memory available inside
the GPU. When a warp (i.e. a group of threads, the
minimum size of the data processed in SIMD fashion)
executes an instruction that accesses global memory,
it coalesces [25] the memory accesses of the threads
within the warp into one or more memory transactions.
This allows reducing memory access latency.
2) Shared Memory: Shared memory is expected to
be much faster than global memory. Such a memory
is located near each processor core in order to obtain
low-latency access (similarly to cache memory). Each
multiprocessor is equipped with the same amount of
shared memory. The size of the shared memory is in
the order of Kilobytes (e.g. 16KB or 64KB times the
number of the available multiprocessors). Thanks to
shared memory, threads belonging to the same block
can efficiently cooperate by seamlessly sharing data.
The information stored inside a shared memory bank
can be accessed only by threads belonging to the same block. Each block can be scheduled onto one multiprocessor
per time. As such, a thread can only access the shared memory available to a single multiprocessor. The CUDA
developers guide [23] encourages coders to make use of this memory as much as possible. In particular, specific
access patterns are to be followed to reach maximum throughput. Shared memory is split into equally-sized memory
modules, called banks, which can be accessed simultaneously.
3) Local Memory: Local memory accesses usually only occur for some automatic variables. This kind of memory
is usually mapped onto global memory, so accesses have the same high latency and low bandwidth as global
memory and are subject to the same requirements for memory coalescing [25]. Local memory is organized such
that consecutive 32-bit words are accessed by consecutive thread IDs. Accesses are therefore fully coalesced as
long as all threads in a warp access the same relative address. On devices with compute capability 2.x or newer,
local memory accesses are always cached in L1 and L2, similarly to global memory [23]. It is worth noting that the
L1 cache size can be set at compile time. This allows the programmer to fine tune data access latency according
to requirements.
4) Registers: CUDA registers represent the fastest and smallest latency memory of GPUs. However, as we will
show later, CUDA registers are prone to leakage vulnerabilities. The number of registers used by a kernel can have
a significant impact on the number of resident warps: the fewer registers a kernel uses, the more threads and thread
blocks are likely to reside on a multiprocessor, improving performance. Therefore, the compiler uses heuristics to
minimize register usage through register spilling. This mechanism places variables in local memory that could have
5exceeded the number of available registers
B. Preliminary considerations
The CUDA programming model assumes that both the host and the device maintain their own separate memory
spaces in DRAM, respectively host memory and device memory. Therefore, a program manages the global, constant,
and texture memory spaces through calls to the CUDA runtime. This includes device memory allocation and
deallocation as well as data transfer between host and device memory. Such primitives implement some form of
memory protection that is worth investigating. In fact, it would be interesting to explore the possibility of accessing
these memory areas bypassing such primitives. Moreover, this would imply to analyze what kind of memory
isolation is actually implemented. In particular, it would be interesting to investigate whether it is possible to obtain
a specific global memory location by leveraging GPU allocation primitives. Further, when two different kernels
A,B are being executed on the same GPU, it would be interesting to know what memory addresses can be accessed
by kernel A or if A can read or write locations that have been allocated to B in global memory. What happens to
memory once it is deallocated is undefined, and released memory is not guaranteed to be zeroed [26], [27]. Finally,
the trend in memory hierarchy is to have a single unified address space between GPU and CPU (see also [23]). An
example is the GMAC [28] user-level library that implements an Asymmetric Distributed Shared Memory model. In
fact, the CUDA unified virtual address space mode (Unified Virtual Addressing) puts both CPU and GPU execution
in the same address space. This alleviates CUDA software from copying data structures between address spaces,
but it can be an issue on the driver side since GPUs and CPUs can compete over the same memory resources. In
fact, such a unified address space can allow potential information leakage.
Table I summarizes existing compute capabilities and the main novelty with respect to the previous version of
the architecture. The third column shows the potential leakage areas that specific versions of the platform can be
subject to, stemming from its architectural characteristics and functionality.
III. RATIONALES OF VULNERABILITIES RESEARCH
The strategy adopted by IT companies to preserve trade secrets consists in not revealing much details about
the internals of their products. Although this is considered the best strategy from a commercial point-of-view, for
what concerns security this approach usually leads to unexpected breaches [29]. Despite this serious drawback, the
security-through-obscurity approach has been embraced by the graphics technology companies as well.
Many implementation details about the CUDA architecture are not publicly available. Once a program invokes a
CUDA routine it partially looses the control over its data. In particular, uncertainty increases when data is transferred
to the GPU. If we only consider the public information about the architecture, it is unclear if any of the security
constraints that are usually enforced in the Operating System (OS), are maintained inside the GPU. The only
implementation details available via official sources just focus on performance. For instance, NVIDIA describes
in details which are the suggested access patterns to global memory in order to achieve the highest throughput.
In contrast, important implementation details about security features are simply omitted. For instance, there is no
official information about the internals of CUDA memory management: it is undefined/uncertain whether memory
is zeroed [27] after releasing it.
Our working hypothesis as for the strategy adopted by GPU manufacturers is that they lean to trade-off perfor-
mance against security. Indeed, one of the main objectives of the GPGPU framework is to speed-up computations
in High Performance Computing. In such a context, the memory initialization after each kernel invocation could
introduce a non-negligible overhead [30].
To make things worse, NVIDIA implemented memory isolation between different cudaContext within its closed
source driver. Such a choice can introduce vulnerabilities, as explained in the following example. Suppose that an
host process Pi needs to perform some computation on a generic data structure S. The computation on S needs to
be offloaded to the GPU for performance reasons. Hence, Pi allocates some host memory M ih to store S; then it
reserves memory on the device M id and copies M ih to M id using the CUDA runtime primitives. From this moment
onwards, the access control on M id is not managed by the host OS and CPU. It becomes exclusive responsibility of
the NVIDIA GPU driver. That is, in this context the driver takes the place of the Operating System. Due to their
importance, the isolation mechanisms provided by an Operating System are usually subject to a thorough review.
The same is not true for GPU drivers. Hence, this architecture raises questions such as whether it is possible for a
6process Pj to circumvent the GPU Virtual Memory Manager (VMM) and obtain unauthorized access to the GPU
memory of process Pi.
Providing memory isolation in CUDA is probably far more complex than in traditional architectures. As described
in Section II, CUDA threads may access data from multiple memory spaces during their execution. Although this
separation allows to improve the performance of the application, it also increases the complexity of access control
mechanisms and makes it prone to security breaches. Memory transfers across the PCIe bus for the global, constant,
and texture memory spaces are costly. As such, they are made persistent across kernel launches by the same
application. This implies that the NVIDIA driver stores application-related state information in its data structures.
As a matter of fact, in case of interleaved execution of CUDA kernels belonging to different host processes, the
driver should prevent process Pi to perform unauthorized access to memory locations reserved to any process Pj .
Indeed, as it will be proved and detailed in Section IV, this mechanism has a severe flaw and could leak information.
A solution that preserves isolation in memory spaces like global memory, that in the newer boards reaches the size
of several Gigabytes, could be unsuitable for more constrained resources like shared memory or registers. Indeed,
both shared memory and registers have peculiarities that rise the level of complexity for the memory isolation
process. The shared memory, for example, is like a cache memory which is directly usable by the developers. This
is in contrast with more traditional architectures such as x86 where software is usually cache-oblivious. For what
concerns registers, a feature that could taint memory isolation is that registers can be used to access global memory
as well: in fact, a modern GPU feature (named register spilling) allows to map a large number of kernel variables
onto a small number of registers. When the GPU runs out of hardware registers, it can transparently leverage global
memory instead.
In order to investigate the aforementioned questions, we performed a few experiments on two different generations
of CUDA-enabled devices (Fermi and Kepler) using a black-box approach. It is important to note that in our
experiments we consider an adversary which is able to interact with the GPU only through legitimate invocations
to CUDA Runtime.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This section describes the test campaign we set-up on GPU hardware to investigate the possible weaknesses of
CUDA architectures. Following the results of the analysis of the CUDA architecture and according to the rationales
for attacks described in the previous section, a number of experiments were scheduled. As mentioned in Section II,
a process in CUDA terminology is identified by its cudaContext. In fact, a host thread usually gets assigned a single
context cudaContext. The performed experiments aim at discovering if, and under what conditions, a cudaContext
Ca can maliciously access data belonging to another cudaContext Cb. If this happens, it would be a violation of
the memory isolation mechanisms.
Tests were performed on the Linux platform using different CUDA HW/SW configurations. The rationale behind
this choice is that the vast majority of shared/distributed GPU computing offerings (GPU clusters and GPU-as-a-
Service), are hosted on Linux [19].
In the following subsections we will detail three different leakage attacks targeted at different memory spaces.
Each leakage has specific preconditions and characteristics. As a consequence, proposed attack countermeasures
will be quite different. For each kind of leakage, we developed a C program making use of the standard CUDA
Runtime Library. In just a single case we had to directly write PTX assembly code in order to obtain the desired
behavior.
The rest of this section is organized as follows: the experimental testbed is described in detail in Subsection
IV-A; in Subsection IV-B the first and simplest leakage is discussed regarding shared memory; in Subsection IV-C a
potentially much more extended (in size) information leakage is detailed—while not leveraging shared memory—;
finally the most complex and powerful information leakage is described in Subsection IV-D. It leverages registry
usage and local memory.
A. Experimental Setup
The experimental testbed is composed by COTS CUDA hardware and production-level SDKs. In order to verify
whether the obtained information leakage was independent from the implementation of a specific GPU, and thus to
7TABLE II
SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF THE EXPERIMENTS
Leakage Preconditions
Shared Complete Pa is running
memory
Global Complete Pa has terminated and Pb
memory allocates the same amount of
memory as Pa
Registers Partial none
TABLE III
THE TESTBED USED FOR THE EXPERIMENTS
GPU Model Tesla C2050 GeForce GT 640
CUDA Driver 4.2 5.0
CUDA Runtime 4.2 4.2
CUDA Capability 2.0 3.0
GPU Architecture Fermi GF100 Kepler GK107
Global Memory 5 GB 2 GB
Shared Memory per MP 48 KB 16 KB
Registers 32768 65536
Warp Size 32 32
CUDA Cores 448 384
Multiprocessors (MP) 14 2
Total Shared Memory 672KB 32KB
Linux Kernel 3.3.7-x86 64 3.5.2-x86 64
make our experiments more general, two radically different configurations were chosen. On the one hand, a Tesla
card that can be considered targeting the HPC sector; on the other hand, a GeForce card targeted at consumers
and enthusiasts. The Tesla card implements the Fermi architecture whereas the GeForce card belongs to the newer
Kepler family, i.e. the latest generation of NVIDIA GPUs. As such, the two GPUs differ with respect to the
supported CUDA Capability (2.0 for the Fermi and 3.0 for the GeForce). In our experiments the compiling process
took into consideration the differences between the target architectures. In Table III we report the specifications of
the two GPUs. The reported size of shared memory and registers represent the amount of memory available for a
single block (see [23]).
Each experiment was replicated on both configurations; in some cases we tuned some of the parameters to
explicitly fit the GPU specifications (e.g. the size of shared memory).
B. Shared Memory Leakage
In this scenario the objective of the adversary is to read information stored in shared memory by other processes. In
order to do so the adversary uses regular runtime API functions. Present CUDA Runtime allows each cudaContext to
have exclusive access to the GPU. As a consequence, CUDA Runtime does not feature any preemption mechanism2.
The Runtime keeps on accepting requests even when the GPU is busy running a kernel. Such requests are in fact
queued and later run in a FIFO style. It is worth noting that the above mentioned requests can belong to different
CUDA Contexts. As such, if no memory cleaning functionality is invoked, when a context-switch occurs, information
could be spilled.
In fact, every time a malicious process is rescheduled on the GPU, it can potentially read the last-written data
of the previous process that used the GPU. As such, the scheduling order affects which data is exposed. As an
2The only preemption available in CUDA is related to blocks belonging to the same kernel. In fact, blocks can be preempted during their
execution and assigned to another multiprocessor depending on the scheduler
8Fig. 3. The schedule that causes the leakage on shared memory.
example if Pa is performing subsequent rounds of an algorithm, the state of the data that can be read reflects the
state reached by the algorithm itself.
The experiment to validate such hypothesis is set-up as follows: two different host-threads belonging to distinct
processes are created; Pa being the honest process, and Pb the malicious one trying to sneak trough Pa memory.
Pa executes K times a kernel that writes in shared memory (K = 50 in this test). In this experiment Pa copies
a vector Vg. Every element in Vg is of type uint32 t as defined in the header file stdint.h. The size of the vector
is set equal to the size of the physical shared memory: 48KB and 16KB respectively for the Tesla C2050 and
the GeForce GT 640. The copy proceeds from global memory to shared memory. The host thread initializes Vg
deterministically using incremental values (i.e. Vg[i] = [i]). Pb executes K invocations of a kernel that reads shared
memory. In particular, Pb allocates a vector Vg and declares in shared memory a vector Vs of size equal to the
shared memory size. Then data is copied from Vs to Vg.
With this particular sequence of operations (see Figure 3) Pb recovers exactly the same set of values written by
Pa in shared memory during its execution. That is, a complete information leakage happens as regards the content
of memory used by Pa. One of the parameters of the function developed for this experiment is the kernel block and
grid size. In our tests we have adopted a number of blocks equal to the actual number of physical multiprocessors
of the GPU. As regards the number of threads we have specified a size equal to the warp-size.
Quite surprisingly, the values captured by Pb appear exactly in the same order as they were written by Pa. This is
not an obvious behavior. In fact, given that the GPUs feature a block of shared memory for each multiprocessor, a
different scheduling of such multiprocessors would lead to different orderings of the read values. In order to better
investigate this issue, we make use of another vector where the first thread of each thread-block writes the ID of
the processor it is hosted on. This info is contained in the special purpose register smid that the CUDA Instruction
Set Architecture (ISA) is allowed to read. In fact, smid is a predefined, read-only special register that returns the
processor (SM) identifier on which a particular thread is executing. The SM identifier ranges from 0 to nsmid− 1,
where nsmid represents the number of available processors. As a consequence, in order to read this information,
we embedded the following instruction, written in PTX assembler, inside the kernel function:
asm("mov.u32 %0, \%smid;" : "=r"(ret) );
The above instruction copies the unsigned 32-bit value of register %smid into the ret variable residing in global
memory. Note that CUDA deterministically chooses the multiprocessors for the first nsmid blocks. As an example,
for the Fermi card we obtained the multiprocessor ID sequence: 0, 4, 8, 12, 2, 6, 10, 13, 1, 5, 9, 3, 7, 11. This is
good news for predictability and for information leakage, and it is a valid explanation for the fact that process Pa
was able to read the values in the same order they were written by process Pb. In order to obtain the information
leakage, it is essential for the kernel of Pb to be scheduled on the GPU before the termination of host process Pa.
In fact, we experimentally verified that shared memory is zeroed by the CUDA runtime before the host process
invokes the exit() function.
C. Global Memory Leakage
In this scenario the adversary manages to get unauthorized access to information contained in GPU Global
Memory. The vulnerability that is exploited is due to the lack of memory-zeroing operations.
As before, we have two independent host processes, namely Pa and Pb, representing the honest and the malicious
process, respectively. In this experiment (see Figure 4) Pa is executed first and allocates four vectors V1, V2, V3, V4
9Fig. 4. The schedule that causes the leakage on global memory.
Fig. 5. The schedule that causes the leakage on Registers. In this scenario Pb accesses the global memory without runtime primitives.
of size D bytes each in GPU memory (dynamic allocation on the GPU uses the cudaMalloc() primitive). The i-th
elements of vectors V1 and V2 are initialized in the host thread as follows:
V1[i] = i;V2[i] = D + i
We set D equal to 64 KB. As such, by juxtaposing V1 and V2 we obtain all values from 0 to 64K − 1. Then,
Pa invokes a kernel that copies V1 and V2 into V3 and V4, respectively. Pa then terminates and Pb gets scheduled.
Pb allocates four vectors V1, V2, V3, V4 of size D bytes each, just as Pa did before.
It is worth noting that Pb does not perform any kind of vector initialization. Pb now runs the very same kernel
code Pa executed before and copies V3 and V4 back in the host memory. At this point, Pb obtains exactly the same
content written before by Pa. As a consequence, we can say that the information leakage on this kind of memory
is full.
By allocating different amounts of memory, partial leakage is obtained, whereas a total leakage can be obtained
only by reallocating exactly the same amount of memory released before.
D. Register-Based Leakage
In this last described leakage, the adversary makes use of GPU registers to access global memory. In fact, by
__device__
void get_reg32bit(uint32_t *regs32) {
# declaration of 8300 registers
asm(".reg .u32 r<8300>;\n\t");
# move the content of register r0 into
# the position 0 of regs32[]
asm("mov.u32 %0, r0;" : "=r"(regs32[0]));
asm("mov.u32 %0, r1;" : "=r"(regs32[1]));
...
asm("mov.u32 %0, r8191;" : "=r"(regs32[8191]));
}
Fig. 6. A snippet of the code that allows to access global memory without cudaMalloc
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TABLE IV
NUMBER OF BYTES LEAKED WITH TWO ROUNDS OF THE REGISTER SPILLING EXPLOIT. DIFFERENT ROUNDS COULD LEAK DIFFERENT
LOCATIONS OF GLOBAL MEMORY. WE DO NOT CONSIDER REPETITIONS (I.E. AN ADDRESS THAT LEAKS IN BOTH ROUNDS)
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Fig. 7. The number of different locations leaked depends on the number of rounds.
using the PTX intermediate language (see Figure 1), we are able to exactly specify in a kernel how many registers
it will actually need during execution. If the required number of registers exceeds those physically available on
chip, the compiler (PTX to CUBIN) starts spilling registers and actually using global memory instead. The number
of available registers per each block depends on the chip capability (i.e. 32K for CUDA capability 2.0 and 64K
for CUDA capability 3.0).
In Figure 6 a PTX code fragment that can be used by the kernel for register reservation is shown. From the
point of view of an adversary, register spilling is an easy way to access global memory bypassing runtime access
primitives. In our experiments we tried to understand whether such an access mechanism to global memory would
undergo the same access controls memory allocation primitives (e.g. cudaMalloc()) are subject to.
Surprisingly, we discovered this was not true and we found out the described mechanism could allow a malicious
process to access memory areas that had been reserved to other cudaContexts. It is important to stress that the
malicious process can access those locations even while the legitimate process still owns them (namely before
it calls the cudaFree()). This is the reason why we believe this latter leakage is the most dangerous among the
presented ones.
Actually, we were able to replicate such an attack exclusively on the Kepler GPU. However, we are investigating
the configuration parameters that cause the information leaks on Fermi.
In the remaining part of this section we describe in details the steps required to obtain the leakage. As a
preliminary step, we zeroed the whole memory available on the device in order to avoid tainting the results. As
for previous experiments, we needed two independent host processes, Pa and Pb, as the honest and the malicious
processes, respectively.
Pa performs several writes into the global memory whereas Pb tries to circumvent the memory isolation
mechanisms to read those pieces of information. In order to verify in a more reliable way the attack outcome,
Pa writes a pattern that is easy to recognize; in particular Pa allocates an array and marks the first location with the
hexadecimal value 0xdeadbeef. At position j of the array, Pa stores the value 0xdeadbeef + j where j represents
the offset in the array represented in hexadecimal.
Pb reserves a predefined number of registers and copies the content of the registers back to the host memory;
in this way Pb tries to exploit the register spilling to violate the memory locations reserved by Pa. Indeed, if the
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register spilling mechanism is not properly implemented, then some memory locations reserved to Pa could be
inadvertently assigned to Pb. We ran Pa and Pb concurrently and we checked for any leaked location marked by
Pa.
As per Figure 5, in this case Pb succeeds in accessing memory locations reserved by Pa before this latter executes
the cudaFree memory releasing operation. Note that this behavior is different from the one observed for the global
memory attack described in Section IV-C.
We ran both Pa and Pb with a gridsize of 2 blocks and a blocksize of 32 threads. In Table IV the number of bytes
of Pa that are read by process Pb is reported. The analysis was conducted by varying the amount of registers declared
by Pb and by varying the amount of memory locations declared by Pa. Results show two rounds of the experiment.
As an example, if Pb reserves a 32KB register space (corresponding to 8K 32-bit registers), and Pa allocates
an amount of memory equal to 32MB, by executing the mentioned experiment twice, we obtain an information
leakage of 64KB (i.e. 16K 32-bit words). This is due to the fact that in different rounds the leakage comprises
different memory locations. The rationale is the dynamic memory management mechanism that is implemented in
the GPU driver and in the CUDA Runtime. As a consequence, this attack is even more dreadful as the adversary,
by executing several rounds, can potentially read the whole memory segment allocated by Pa.
In order to better quantitatively evaluate this phenomenon, we have investigated and analyzed the relationship
between the number of locations where the leakage succeeds and the number of executed rounds. In Figure 7 results
are shown with respect to a number of rounds ranging from 1000 to 10000. Growth is linear in the number of rounds.
In particular, the leakage starts from 32K locations for 1000 rounds and reaches 320K locations leaked when the
number of rounds is 10000. The leaked locations belong to contiguous memory areas; the distance between each
location is 32 bytes. For example, if the leaked locations start from byte 0 and end at byte 320, then we obtain
10 locations: one location every 32 bytes. We claim that this behavior depends on the implementation and the
configuration of the kernel. A more thorough analysis will be provided in future works.
The results of this experiment suggest a further study on the possibility for a malicious process to obtain
write access to the leaked locations. In order to investigate this vulnerability, we performed an additional set of
experiments.
We kept the same configuration as the previous test but, to foster the detection of the potential unauthorized write
accesses, we used a cryptographic hash function. Indeed, thanks to the properties of hash functions, if the malicious
process succeeds in interfering with the computation of the legitimate process—for instance, by altering even only
a single bit—, this would cause (with overwhelming probability) errors in the output of the legitimate process.
For Pa, we used a publicly-available GPU implementation of the SHA-1 hash function included into the SSLShader3:
an SSL reverse proxy transparently translating SSL sessions to TCP sessions for back-end servers. The encryp-
tion/decryption is performed on-the-fly through a CUDA implementation of several cryptographic algorithms.
Actually, the codes that implements the GPU cryptograhpic algorithm, are contained in the libgpucrypto library
which can be downloaded from the same web site. For our experiments we used the version 0.1 of this library.
In this test, Pa uses the GPU to compute the SHA-1 for 4096 times on a constant plaintext of 16KB. Pa stores
each hash in a different memory location. To test the integrity of GPU-computed hashes, Pa also computes the
SHA-1 on the CPU using the OpenSSL library and then compares this result with the ones computed on the GPU.
The malicious process Pb tries to taint the computation of Pa by writing a constant value into the leaked locations.
The following PTX instruction is used:
asm("mov.u32 r1,\%0;":"=r"(value));
asm("mov.u32 r2,\%0;":"=r"(value));
...
asm("mov.u32 rMAX,\%0;":"=r"(value));
where value is an uint32 t constant value and MAX represents the number of registers reserved by Pb.
In our test we ran Pa 1000 times and concurrently we launched the malicious process Pb. Even if in most cases
we were able to read a portion of the memory reserved to Pa, the write instruction was ignored and all the
3The source code is available at http://shader.kaist.edu/sslshader at the time of writing
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Input:
~M : The plaintext
l: The length of the plaintext
~K: array of identifiers of the encryption key
Output: TRUE if the attack succeeds, FALSE otherwise
1 FindLeakage( ~M ,l, ~K)
2 begin
3 s ← size of current allocable global memory on GPU
4 P ← cudamalloc(s)
5 j ← 0
6 while j < s do
7 w ← P[j]
8 if w ∈ ~K then
9 cudamemset(P,0,s) /*zeroing*/
10 return TRUE;
11 else if w ==M [0] then
12 i← 0
13 while i < l do
14 if P [j + i] != M [i] then
15 cudamemset(P,0,s) /*zeroing*/
16 return FALSE
17 i++
18 end
19 cudamemset(P,0,s) /*zeroing*/
20 return TRUE
21 j++
22 end
23 cudamemset(P,0,s)
24 return FALSE
25 end
Algorithm 1: The pseudo-code of the attacking process in the AES case study.
hashes computed on the GPU were correct. In conclusion, our experiments’ findings show that the register spilling
vulnerability does not seem to allow interfering with the computation of the legitimate process.
V. CASE STUDY: SSLSHADER - GPU ACCELERATED SSL
In order to evaluate the impact of the global memory vulnerability in a real-world scenario, we attacked the
CUDA implementation of AES presented in [31] which is part of SSLShader. The SSLShader comes with several
utilities that can be used to verify the correctness of the implemented algorithms. To run our experiments, we
modified one of these utilities. In particular, we changed the AES test utility to encrypt a constant plaintext using
a fixed key. We chose a constant plaintext of 4KB (i.e. the first two Chapters of the Divine Comedy written in
latex) and a we set the 128-bit encryption key to the juxtaposition of following words: 0xdeadbeef, 0xcafed00d,
0xbaddcafe,0x8badf00d.
In this experiment we assume that the GPU is shared between the adversary and the legitimate process. Further,
we assume that the adversary can read the ciphertext.
The steps performed by the attacking process are described in Algorithm 1. We consider the attack successful in
two cases: in the first case, the adversary gets access to the whole plaintex (line 11)—achieving plaintext leakage;
in the second case, the adversary obtains some words of the encryption key (line 8)—achieving key leakage. Even
if this latter case is less dreadful than the former one, it still jeopardizes security. Indeed, in order to obtain the
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Fig. 8. The number of leakages in the Kepler architecture. Each bin in this Figure represents the number of times that the leakage occured
in 100 runs of Algorithm 1. We report the results for 9 rounds of this experiments
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Fig. 9. The number of leakages in the Fermi architecture. Each bin in this Figure represents the number of times that the leakage occured
in 100 runs of Algorithm 1. We report the results for 9 rounds of this experiments
desired information, the adversary could attack the undisclosed portion of the key (e.g. via brute force, differential
cryptanalysis [32]) and eventually decrypt the message.
The experiment is composed of the following steps: first we run an infinite loop of the CUDA AES encryption; in
the meanwhile we run Algorithm 1 100 times. In order to avoid counting a single leakage event more than once,
each execution of the Algorithm 1 zeroes the memory (lines 9, 15, 19, 24). We repeated this experiment 50 times
on both the Kepler and the Fermi architectures, measuring the amount of successful attacks per round. In order to
preserve the independence across different rounds, at the end of each round we rebooted the machine.
For the Kepler we measured a successful attack mean equal to 30% with a standard deviation equal to 0.032. As
for the Fermi architecture, we measured a mean success rate of 12% with a standard deviation of 0.03. Figure 8
details the results of 9 randomly chosen rounds in terms of key leakage and plaintext leakage for Kepler. The
plaintext leakage is slightly more frequent than the key leakage. Figure 9 shows the results for Fermi; in this case
the frequencies of the two leakages are equal.
A. Discussion and qualitative analysis
It is worth adding further considerations about the conditions that lead to an effective information leakage. Indeed,
with our attack methodology we are able to leak only the final state of the previous GPU process. This limitation
is due to the exclusive access granted by the driver to host threads that access the GPU; only one cudaContext is
allowed to access the GPU at a given time.
However, note that in some circumstances the final state of a computation is sensitive (e.g. the decryption of a
ciphertext, the output of a risk-analysis function or the Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) locations of an oil
14
well). In other circumstances the final state of a computation is not sensitive or even public. For instance, knowing
the final state of an encryption process (i.e. the ciphertext) does not represent a threat.
However, in our experiments we were able to recover the original plaintext even after the encryption process ended.
This was possible due to the fact that the plaintext and the ciphertext were stored in different locations of the global
memory. This condition allowed us to bypass the final-state limitation. As such, this vulnerability depends on both
the implementation and the computed function and does not hold in the general case.
Another important consideration about the presented case study concerns the precondition of the attack. In order to
perform the key leakage test we assume that the adversary knows a portion of the key (which is needed to perform
searches in memory and detect if the leakage happened). However, as shown in [33], [34] it is possible to exploit
the high entropy of the encryption keys to restrict the possible candidates to a reasonable number. In fact, secure
encryption keys usually have a higher entropy than other binary data in memory.
As a further technical note we found out that SSLShader [31], i.e. the widespread publicly available implementa-
tion of cryptographic algorithms on GPU, makes use of the cudaHostAlloc CUDA primitive. This primitive allocates
a memory area in the host memory that is page-locked and accessible to the device (pinned memory). Although
this can be considered more secure than using the cudaMalloc, it is fully vulnerable to information leakage as well.
In fact, the CUDA Runtime copies the data to the GPU’s global memory on behalf of the programmer when it
is more convenient. This is important since it shows that even code implemented by “experts” actually shows the
same deficiencies as regards security. This finding, together with the others reported in the paper, call for solutions
to this severe vulnerability.
VI. PROPOSED COUNTERMEASURES
In previous sections the main issues and vulnerabilities of Kepler and Fermi CUDA architectures have been
highlighted. This section suggests alternative approaches and countermeasure that prevent or at least dramatically
limit the described information leakage attacks.
In general, from the software point of view, CUDA code writers should pay particular attention to zeroing memory
as much as possible at the end of kernel execution.
Unfortunately, this is troublesome for a number of reasons:
• Most often the programmer does not have fine control over kernel code (e.g. if the kernel is the outcome of
high-level programming environments such as JavaCL, Jcuda [22], etc);
• The kernel programmer usually aims at writing the fastest possible code without devoting time to address
security/isolation issues that might hamper performance.
As such, we believe that the best results can be obtained if security-enhancements are performed at the driver/hard-
ware level. From the CUDA Platform/Hardware point of view:
• Finer MMU memory protection must be put in place to prevent concurrent kernels from reading other kernel’s
memory;
• CUDA should also allow the OS to collect and access forensics information (this hypothesis requires the host
is trusted).
In the following, for each of the discovered vulnerabilities, we provide related mitigation countermeasures.
A. Shared Memory
As for the shared memory leakage shown in Section IV-B, the proposed fix makes use of a memory-zeroing
mechanism. As already pointed out in Section IV-B the shared memory attack is ineffective once the host process
terminates. The vulnerability window goes from kernel completion to host process completion. As a consequence,
the memory-zeroing operation is better executed inside the kernel. In our opinion, this is a sensitive solution since
shared memory is an on-chip area that cannot be directly addressed or copied by the host thread. As such, it is not
possible to make use of it from outside kernel functions.
In order to measure the overhead that an in-kernel memory-zeroing approach would have on a real GPU, we
developed and instrumented a very simple CUDA code (addition of two vectors). Two kernel functions, K1 and K2
were developed: K1 receives as input two randomly-initialized vectors A,B; K1 sums the two vectors and stores
the result in vector C; K2 is the same as K1 but in addition it “zeroes” the shared memory area by overwriting
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it with the value read from A[0]4. We measured the execution time difference between K1 and K2 by varying the
vectors’ size, as this experiment was meant to evaluate the scalability of the zeroing operation. In particular, for K1
and K2, we performed this experiment accessing an increasing number of locations up to the maximum available
shared memory. Such value depends on the GPU capability (see Table III) and corresponds to 672KB for the Tesla
C2050 and 32KB for the GT640. We noticed that the introduced overhead was constant and not affected by the
number of memory accesses. In particular we measured a mean overhead of 1.66 ms on the Kepler and 0.27 ms on
the Tesla card. We concluded that the proposed fix can be applied without noticeably affecting GPU performance.
B. Global Memory
As described in SectionIV-C, accessing global memory through CUDA primitives can cause an information
leakage. The natural fix would consist in zeroing memory before it is given to the requesting process. This way,
when information is deleted the malicious process/party is not able to access such information. This approach
should naturally be implemented inside the CUDA Runtime. To assess the impact of the overhead introduced by
this solution, we measured the overhead that the same zeroing operation imposes to traditional memory allocation.
CUDA Runtime function cudaMemset was used for zeroing memory content. An incremental size buffer was tested
in the experiments. In our tests, size ranged from 16MB to 512MB, in steps of 16MB. We then measured the
overhead induced by the additional zeroing operations. To achieve this goal, we instrumented the source code with
the EventManagement Runtime library function. Through these primitives we were able to compute the time elapsed
between two events in milliseconds with a resolution of around 0.5 microseconds.
As shown in Figure 10, the introduced overhead is not negligible. On both Tesla and Kepler platforms the induced
overhead is linearly proportional to allocated buffer size. However, Tesla’s line steepness is much lower than the
Kepler counterpart. The reason is that the two GPUs feature a much different number of multiprocessors (14 for
Tesla vs. 2 for the Kepler). As such the level of achievable parallelism is quite different.
As regards the implemented memory-zeroing approach, threads run in parallel, each one zeroing its serial memory
area. This accounts for the measured overhead. However, since the data chunk has a very limited size, the overhead
is—in absolute values—very small (1.66 ms Kepler 0.27 ms TeslaFermi). It is worth noting that a low-level
hardware approach would be surely faster. However, in general zeroing does worsen performance in GPU [30],
as these techniques force additional memory copies between host and device memory. In addition, we only have
implementation details on global memory that is actually implemented on commodity GDDRx memory, i.e. as
standard host memory. Introducing an additional mechanism to perform smart memory zeroing would require an
overall redesign of the GDDR approach and as such it will most probably increase RAM cost. Hardware-based
fast zeroing would probably be the most feasible and conevenient solution. However, inner details about low-level
memory implementation for CUDA cards are only known by Nvidia.
Pertaining to the selective deletion of sensitive data, selectively zeroing specific memory areas is potentially
feasible and would potentially reduce unnecessary memory transfers between GPU and CPU, since most data
would not have to be transferred again. A “smart” solution would probably be the addition of CUDA language
extensions (source code tags) to mark the variables/memory areas that have to be zeroed since containing sensitive
data. On the one hand, this would require language/compiler modifications while, on the other hand, it would
save some costly data transfers. However, this approach implies some caveats, as there is the risk of pointing the
adversary exactly to the memory and registers where sensitive data is. Further, such sensitive data when in transit
between CPU and GPU crosses various memory areas that are still potentially accessible. As such, for performance
sake, sensitive areas should be as contiguous as possible.
C. Registers
Register allocation is handled at lower level in the software stack, hence the leak is probably due to an
implementation bug regarding the memory isolation module. Therefore, fixing this leakage at the application level
is quite difficult. A much simpler workaround would be to implement the fix at the GPU driver level. Unfortunately,
4we did not actually “zero” the memory using the value 0 to prevent the compiler from performing optimization that would have affected
the result.
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Fig. 10. Overhead introduced by the proposed countermeasure for the global memory leak
given the closed-source nature of the driver, at present only NVIDIA can provide a fix for this issue. In particular,
the driver should preserve the following properties: first, the registers should not spill to locations in global memory
that are still reserved for host-threads; second, the locations of the spilled registers must be reset to zero when they
are released.
VII. RELATED WORK
Information leakage is a serious problem that has been addressed in a variety of different scenarios.
Many side channel attacks on cache-timing have been proposed in the literature ( [35], [36], [37]). Such attacks
are relevant as they exploit the vulnerabilities of the underlying HW/SW architecture. In particular, Shamir et al.
[35] managed to infer information about the internal state of a cipher by exploiting time-based side channels on the
x86 CPU caches. We have to say that CPU caches are quite different from GPU shared memory considered in the
present paper [38]. Indeed, contrary to CPU cache memory, GPU shared memory is addressable by the programmer
[39]. In the GPU environment, the adversary does not need to exploit time side-channels to infer information about
the shared memory since the adversary can just read it. Modern GPUs are equipped with a hierarchical cache
system. However, timing facilities in the CPU are much more precise than the coarse grained timing hardware
currently available on GPUs. As such, exploiting time-based side channel of GPU cache memories would require
a specific investigation effort that is out of the scope of present work.
In [40] the authors analyze a category of side-channel attacks known as profiled cache-timing attacks, and develop
a methodology that allows an adversary (capable of a limited number of side-channel measurements) to choose the
best attack strategy. In [41], the authors propose a HW solution to minimize the capacity of covert timing channel
across different levels of trust in Multilevel Security Systems. However, in [42] the authors devise a technique to
compromise the security provided by these hardware components. Note that in this work we do not resort to timing
side-channels as the tests we performed indicated that reliable timing is quite hard to achieve on the GPU platforms
used for the experiments.
Evidence exists that security and isolation are not considered as important as performance. In fact, the trend towards
increased resource sharing among cores is represented by Gupta et al. [43] that encourage resource sharing inside
future multicores for performance, fault tolerance and customized processing. The vision suggests reducing isolation
among cores for the sake of performance and reliability. However, this opens up new interesting information leakage
opportunities. Oz et al. [44] propose and evaluate a new reliability metric called the Thread Vulnerability Factor
(TVF) that depends on its code but also on the codes of sibling threads. Their evaluation shows that TVF values
tend to increase as the number of cores increases, which means the system becomes more vulnerable as the core
count rises.
A preliminary work by Barenghi et al. [45] investigated side channel attacks to GPUs using both power
consumption and electromagnetic (EM) radiations. The proposed approach can be useful for GPU manufacturers to
protect data against physical attacks. However, for our attacks to work, the adversary does not need either physical
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access to the machine or root privileges. Protecting from an adversary with super-user (or root) administration
privileges is very difficult, as shown in [46], and it is out of the scope of present work.
For what concerns malware-related leaks, Trusted Platform Modules (TPM) [47], [48] and remote attestation
can provide an acceptable level of security by leveraging secure boot. However, vulnerabilities can also stem from
perfectly “legal” code that accesses other parties’ data exploiting vulnerabilities inherently tied to the platform.
Moreover, malicious hardware such as trojan circuitry can bypass software TPM mechanisms and access sensitive
information over the bus. In [49] an architecture is proposed based on an external guardian core that is required
to approve each memory request. Even though the induced performance overhead is too high (60%) and even
though we do not consider malicious hardware in this work, the work in [49] is particularly interesting, as actual
cooperation from the hardware (i.e. from its manufacturers) would be beneficial for information leakage detection
and prevention.
Unfortunately, due to Companies commercial strategy to hide implementation details from competitors, man-
ufacturers are reluctant on publishing the internals of their solutions. In fact, documentation is mostly generic,
marketing-oriented, and incomplete. This fact hinders the analysis of the information leakage problem in the context
of GPU. As such, in the literature most of the available architectural information over existing hardware is due to
black-box analysis. In particular [50] developed a microbenchmark suite to measure architectural characteristics of
CUDA GPUs. The analysis showed various undisclosed characteristics of the processing elements and the memory
hierarchies and exposed undocumented features that impact both program performance and program correctness.
CUBAR [51] used a similar approach to discover some of the undisclosed CUDA details. In particular, CUBAR
showed that CUDA features a Harvard architecture on a Von Neumann unified memory. Further, since the closed-
source driver leverages (the deprecated) security through obscurity paradigm, inferring information from PCIe bus
[23] is possible as partially shown in [17].
The main contribution on GPU security in the literature are mainly related to the integrity of the platform, and
to the exploitation of driver vulnerabilities. GPU thread synchronization issues are introduced and discussed in
[52] whereas reliability of multicore computing is discussed in [53]. Such analysis are aimed towards correctness,
reliability and performance, whereas in this work we focus on actual GPU thread behavior and related consequences
on data access. Further, vulnerabilities have been discovered in the past in the NVIDIA GPU driver [15], [16].
The device driver is a key component of the CUDA system and has kernel level access (via the NVIDIA kernel
module). As such, vulnerabilities in the CUDA system can have nasty effects on the whole system and can lead to
even further information leakage, due to root access capabilities.
A limitation of the current GPU architecture is related to the fact that the OS is completely excluded from the
management of computations that have to be performed on the device. The first attempts to overcome the limits of
present GPU platforms aim at giving the OS kernel the ability to control the marshalling of the GPU tasks [54],
[55]. As a matter of fact, the GPU can be seen as an independent computing system where the OS role is played
by the GPU device driver; as a consequence, host-based memory protection mechanism are actually ineffective to
protect GPU memory.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This work provides a relevant new contribution to the security of the increasingly successful GPGPU computing
field. in the CUDA architecture affecting shared memory, global memory, and registers, that can actually lead to
information leakage. Further, we propose and discuss some fixes to tackle the highlighted vulnerabilities. As for
future work, we are currently investigating GPGPU information leakage issues within Windows OSes.
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